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Directed Reflective Equilibrium: Thought Experiments and How to Use Them 
 
A widely adopted method in philosophy is reflective equilibrium (hereafter RE).
1
 According to 
this method, philosophers should aim to construct a theory that maximally coheres with 
considered moral judgments and general principles as well as a wider range of beliefs and facts.
2
 
The theorist works back and forth between these commitments, discarding previous beliefs if 
necessary, to reach an equilibrium. A central component in the method of RE is the use of 
imaginary and real-world examples, thought experiments and intuition pumps. For simplicity, 
let us call these real or imagined realities cases.  
The use of cases in normative theorising has a long and illustrious history but has also been 
subject to a number of criticisms, which, in turn, threaten the validity of the method of reflective 
equilibrium. First, intuitions about cases are vulnerable to debunking or manipulation. For 
example, we are more averse to prospective losses than we are attracted to prospective gains.
3
 
If the framing of cases can affect our intuitions about them, how can intuition be a reliable guide 
to moral principle? Second, cases often simplify and abstract from real world situations. Some 
worry that intuitions about fantastical cases warp our sense of morality; or that they encourage 
our moral thinking to become unrepresentative of or detached from real-world crises.
4
 A 
suspicion of abstractionism underpins much historical scepticism towards moral theory in 
general,
5
 and similar worries can be raised about hypothetical cases. Third, coherentist 
approaches to methodology (like RE) face a general challenge about what to do in the event of 
inconsistency between our intuitions or between intuitions and basic principles.
6
 To be sure, 
theorists have developed resources to help overcome this impasse: the robustness of judgments, 
the vulnerability of intuitions to debunking, theoretical parsimony, and so on. However, what 
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RE is still lacking is a sense of how cases ought to be ordered in theoretical enquiry, given their 
different uses. 
In this paper we defend a revised version of RE that we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium 
(hereafter DRE). DRE, like its predecessor, accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles 
are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry 
should be brought into equilibrium. However, it also offers guidance about how different types 
of cases ought to be used, thus exhibiting cases at their best and overcoming some of the 
methodological shortcomings faced by RE. With a clearer typology of cases in mind, an order 
of their usage suggests itself which helps overcome the pitfalls of RE. 
The suggested order of the DRE proceeds as follows: First, philosophers should start from what 
we call “seed cases”. Seed cases are situations or dilemmas, usually from real life, that capture 
our moral attention and elicit strong, if unsystematized, intuitions. Second, these cases are then 
“decomposed” into the relevant moral factors at play in the case. Doing so allows the 
philosopher to construct intuition-generating “controlled cases” that represent a class of issues 
in which the relevant factor is present. Testing different versions of these cases against each 
other, the philosopher then seeks to “organize” the general virtues and the strength and scope 
of the elicited intuitions into principles. As in standard RE, this organization will require going 
back and forth between principles and concrete judgements in representative cases. Third, to 
further test these principles, philosophers can create “argument cases” that elicit the recognition 
of reasons rather than intuitions, seeking to support principles on the one hand, and challenge 
biases, metaphysical beliefs, and underlying conceptual assumptions that may taint our 
intuitions on the other.  Fourth, principles that cohere with both intuitions and reasons can be 
“veiled” in the final type of cases: “construction cases”, which set up choice situations into which 
these fundamental principles are already incorporated, making choices that do not accord with 
the principle impossible. Figure 1 shows the two-by-two case taxonomy we are proposing, with 
the two dimensions indicated at the top and left of the figure. The four types of cases we 
distinguish all have a role to play in DRE, ideally in the order indicated by the grey arrows, 
starting with seed cases. And because principles play a central role in RE, all but the seed cases 
have a function related to the formulation, testing, support and systematization of principles. 
Various stages of our model will be familiar to many philosophers. Individuals, and 
philosophical debates more broadly, often employ cases in the ways we recommend. Our 
purpose here is not to fundamentally challenge the way cases are currently used, or to suggest a 
radically different usage, but to systematize pre-existing elements of best practice and to highlight 
the advantages of a specifically directional approach. In the next section, we develop the model 
3 
 
in greater detail, and in section XXXXX, we argue that the model improves on RE by 
addressing some of the pitfalls of the case-based methodology mentioned above.   
 




The first stage of our model employs what we call seed cases. These are cases that capture the 
moral phenomenon we wish to investigate, without making any initial effort to decide what 
factors are morally salient, or to separate relevant from irrelevant factors. Many debates in 
moral philosophy have been inspired by real cases that seem to capture something important 
about the normative landscape. For example, decisions in war may inspire discussions of 
principles in just war theory,
7
 cases of famine or other humanitarian crises may inspire 
discussion of the duty of rescue,
8
 acts of terrorism and political torture may prompt 
discussions of harming others as a means to an end. As well as being taken from real 
scenarios, good seed cases also frequently elicit strong, but conflicting or conflated intuitions. 
Cases of famine, for example, may raise complex moral problems involving, among other 
things, the distinction between positive and negative duties, the stringency of assistive duties, 
historical and contemporaneous responsibility of wealthy countries for poverty-related 
hardship, and many more. The same is true of harming in war, terrorism, and many other 
common seed cases in moral philosophy. These cases often capture important, but complex 
moral problems. They pull our intuitions in different directions, perhaps in accordance with 
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pre-existing moral or political sensibilities, and almost always involve a complex intersecting of 
different morally salient facts.     
 
From Seed to Controlled Cases: Decomposition 
Seed cases provide a starting point for theoretical enquiry, but their complexity or “murkiness” 
can be problematic. The purpose of the next stage, decomposition, is to identify a range of 
factors that have potential moral salience and extract them from the seed case. Once we have 
extracted as many of these factors as possible, they can be formulated into their own cases and 
thereby separated from factors with which they are coexist in the seed case. Let’s take the 
example of harming in war to demonstrate this process. Suppose we take as our seed case a 
report of a soldier killing an unarmed combatant in war. We then break the case down into a 
list of factors that might have moral salience. There may be many such factors, including: (1) 
orders within a military hierarchy, (2) the chaotic context of war, (3) epistemic uncertainty, (4) 
the status of the victim (combatant or non-combatant) (5) whether the victim was armed, (6) the 
culpability of the decision to kill, (7) whether wrongdoing was foreseeable, (8) the moral 
significance of causation, and perhaps more. Each of these factors can then provide the basis of 
further cases where they are separated from others. Many revisionists in just war theory, for 
example, comparing situations in war to structurally similar cases of interpersonal harm, to 
isolate relevant factors from, say, the chaotic context of war or the epistemic uncertainty that 
pervades decisions in war.
9
    
 
Controlled Cases 
Controlled Cases for Separating Factors 
Building on the output of the decomposition, philosophers can systematically integrate the 
different factors into different hypothetical or constructed cases. In our previous example we 
saw how we might separate factors like culpability and causation, consider self-defence outside 
the context of war entirely, stipulate epistemic certainty, and so on. Such cases are made possible 
through decomposition by separating and isolating the different normative factors at play in a 
seed case. We will refer to cases used in this stage of the process of DRE as controlled cases to 
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emphasise their use in separating factors.
10
 Unlike seed cases, which are singular, however, these 
cases aim to represent a particular factor that is present many in real life situations. 
We can clarify the representative dimension of cases by borrowing from the discussion of 
models in the philosophy of science. Put in a nutshell, a model is a representation of a target 
system, and the relevant relation between target system and model is a similarity relation. The 
basic idea goes back to Ronald Giere
11
 and was developed in detail by Peter Godfrey-Smith, 
Michael Weisberg and many others.
12
  
We can think of most models as structures that are relevantly similar to their respective target 
systems. For example, the drawing of a cell in a biology textbook is relevantly similar to many 
different cells in the real world. It is an idealized exemplar of real cells.
13
 What makes it similar 
is that certain structural features are alike. That is true even though no real cell might look 
precisely like the drawing (quite apart from the fact that real cells are not made of ink and paper, 
have three rather than two dimensions, and so on). 
One popular approach in the sciences has a “hub-and-spoke” structure, as Godfrey-Smith 
points out: 
“In these cases, what scientists do is give an exact description of one case of the target 
phenomenon, which acts as a ‘‘hub’’ that anchors a large number of other cases. The ‘‘other’’ 
cases include all the actual-world ones; the hub is a fiction. The central models of both 




This should sound familiar to the theorist drawing on paradigmatic thought experiments. 
Consider Peter Singer’s case of the child drowning in a shallow pond that you pass on your way 
to work and who you could save at little cost to yourself.
15
 This is a fiction, but many structurally 
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similar cases are “anchored” around this “hub” case. The “hub”, or core normative feature, of 
the case is the fact that you can provide great benefits to others at trivial cost to yourself. This 
feature is present in many social, legal, and political dilemmas, where it coexists with and is 
complicated by many other factors.    
The sciences prefer models as equations, computer code or scale models. In normative theory, 
however, most models are “word models,” stated purely in narrative form. The occasional 
formalized game-theoretical model can be found but remains the exception rather than the 
norm. However, this should not detract from the fact that the function is very similar: to 
represent a target system in a way that makes it more amenable to analysis than the real-world 
cases it represents. In physics, frictionless planes are easier to analyse than real imperfect planes, 
but the former still reveal something important about the latter. In normative theory, fictional 
cases of drowning children are (arguably) easier to analyse than complex real-world cases of 
global poverty with various empirical complications, but the former still reveal something 
important about the latter – because they reveal something about one particularly relevant 
normative factor at play in the real-world case.  
 
Controlled Cases and Principle Testing 
A principle is a statement that generalizes to more than one case.
16
 Because principles 
generalize, they enable philosophers to think about cases more systematically. Formulating 
principles naturally follows from decomposition: while the exercise of decomposing shows 
which factors might be relevant for the assessment of a case, well-formulated principles provide 
an account of how the different factors can be used to reach a normative or evaluative 
assessment. 
One can think of a principle as a function, mapping each element of the domain (the set to 
which the principle is applicable) to one element of the codomain (the set of all possible 
assessments provided by the principle). Consider, for instance, a principle aiming to tell us 
which instances of defensive harming are permissible or even required. The domain may 
consist of all possible instances in which a person engages in defensive harm. The codomain 
consists of the three elements (impermissible, permissible, required). The principle, thought of 
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as a function, determines for each possible instance whether this form of defensive harming is 
permissible, impermissible, or required.  
A principle needs to pick up on patterns to be useful. To see this, think first of a maximally 
verbose and therefore not very useful principle: for each element in the domain it explicitly 
states which assessment from the codomain applies. This would result in a gigantic, potentially 
infinitely large lookup-table (“if this, then that…”) that provides an entry for every possible 
situation and the assessment of that situation. Needless to say, such a “principle” barely deserves 
the title. This is why the controlled cases described in the previous sections are so useful – if 
successful, they have already identified which properties can make a difference in the 
assessment, and which do not. The decomposed relevant factors allow the philosophical 
investigator to set aside most of the descriptive richness of the domain elements and instead 
focus on the small number of factors that make a difference. But most principles go further 
than that: instead of listing all possible combinations of factor instantiations, they give us a simple 
heuristic or formula, telling us which patterns of factors lead to which judgement. 
In the seed case and decomposition stage, cases are used for exploratory purposes. But a key 
goal of moral theorizing is to formulate principles or even sets of principles that constitute 
theories. This leads us to two new functions of controlled cases: principle testing and principle 
support. We first turn to the role of principle testing, which is closely related to the question of 
case selection. Because a principle states a general relation between relevant factors and 
assessment, testing it requires that we choose cases systematically, mapping out the space of 
possible factor constellations. With unlimited time, we would want to map out the space 
systematically with a large sample of cases at many different locations. With more limited time, 
moral philosophers tend to select up to three different types of cases. 
First, “corner cases” are situations in which one or more factor takes a (near) minimum or 
maximum value to test how the principle fares in the most extreme settings and assess its 
robustness. For an example of a corner case, take Nozick’s Utility Monster, which creates near 
infinite amounts of wellbeing from each unit of resources given to it.
17
 Utilitarianism seems to 
imply, therefore, that we should always give resources to the utility monster, rather than those 
who are much worse off, because this will maximise utility. Though unrealistic, the Utility 
Monster tests our judgements in a situation where the maximisation of utility is in extreme 
conflict with other possible values, such as equality or priority for the worse off. Corner cases 
give us an opportunity to test our commitments against extreme, even unrealistic pressure, in 
the same way plane wings are bent nearly 90 degrees in a stress test, even if they are unlikely to 
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subject to such pressure during flight. Corner cases can also be counterexamples, the second 
type of controlled case often used for testing principles. Counterexamples often put moral 
judgments under pressure, but more generally they challenge principles by intuitions in the 
opposite direction. The Utility Monster is a corner cases, but it is also a counterexample because 
the intuitive judgement is that resources should go to the worse off rather than the monster, and 
thus the case suggests that Act-Utilitarianism is false. Third, controlled cases that can be used to 
observe the effect of one factor (or a small number of factors in interaction) while holding 
everything else constant, thereby attempting a strategy of isolation to observe singular effects (or 
factor interactions). We will return to some of these functions in the next section.    
 
 
Argument Cases  
We now begin to consider cases on the other side of the elicitation dimension: cases whose 
primary function is not the elicitation of intuitions but of reasons. We first turn to representative 
reason-generating cases, which we call “argument cases” and distinguish two different uses: for 
supporting principles and for testing metaphysical assumptions. 
  
Argument Cases for Supporting Principles 
Cases can lend support to principles in two ways: in exposition, by illustrating the application of 
the principles, or substantively, by demonstrating reasons that support the principles, though 
these two strategies of support often blend into each other. Cases of the former type are 
pedagogical devices for the benefit of the reader: stating the principle precisely would suffice to 
state the view, but an added example of application can support understanding, without 
necessarily supporting the content of the principle. Since this use of cases is familiar and fairly 
common, we won’t analyse it in more detail.  
Cases that aim to provide substantive support for a principle go beyond mere illustration – they 
are also supposed to make the reader susceptible to the acceptance of reasons motivating the 
principle. For example, GA Cohen argues for his version of egalitarianism, and, more 
specifically, his interpretation of the difference principle, by providing an example. In his 
“kidnapper” case, Cohen asks us to imagine a criminal who has abducted a child and now tries 
to convince the parents to pay a ransom to him by insisting that children should be with their 
parents. Cohen points out that while this statement is generally true, the kidnapper is not in a 
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position to appeal to it as a premise of his argument. After all, the kidnapper is the cause why 
the child is not with their parents.
18
  
The kidnapper case is interesting because it does not only elicit an intuition, it also makes the 
readers reason about the argument the kidnapper gives and why it fails. This demonstrates a 
new function of cases: apart from eliciting intuitions, some cases can also be used to elicit 
reasons to support an argument. When a case elicits reasons, it typically also elicits an intuition, 
but the intuition is not the goal of the exercise. In the kidnap case, for example, it is entirely 
unsurprising that we have the intuition that kidnapping is wrong, or that the reasoning provided 
by the kidnapper is preposterous. But the point of the kidnap case is to make the reader reason 
about the standing a speaker needs to have to make certain arguments. This insight is then used 
to criticize certain incentive-based arguments for demanding higher salaries.  
Cases that elicit reasons will normally come with a richer logical structure than cases that elicit 
intuitions only. In Cohen’s kidnapper case, the case itself contained an argument that provokes 
the reader into resisting the argument. Cohen also invites the reader to reason by structural 
analogy when comparing kidnapper with the case of a doctor who only works when they get a 
higher-than-average salary. Another common way to elicit reasons from cases is to compare two 
cases and analyse the difference between them.
19
 
The distinction between cases for testing and for supporting principles allows us to state another 
principle of case use: testing and supporting cases must be chosen according to different criteria. 
Cases illustrate or support by eliciting reasons must be chosen for their ability to enable 
explanation, understanding and reasoning. They will be cases for which the application of the 
principle is most plausible, and they are chosen to make the assessment of the principle 
intuitive. The opposite holds for testing cases: they should be chosen to find out how robust the 
principle is in less paradigmatic case applications. That may involve exploring extreme 
assumptions or pro-actively scanning for counterexamples. Moreover, a meaningful test ought 
to be conducted by confrontation with several (and typically diverse) cases. Thus, the supporting 
and testing role should typically be fulfilled by different cases; running these two functions 
together would be a mistake. 
 
                                                           
18
 Cohen, G. A. “Incentives, Inequality, and Community.” In Tanner Lectures on Human Value, 1991. 
 
19
 Kimberley Brownlee and Zofia Stemplowska. “Thought Experiments.” In: Adrian Blau, ed. Methods 




Argument Cases for Querying Metaphysical Assumptions 
The use of cases is not restricted to evaluative and normative investigations – it is equally 
important in conceptual analysis and even in metaphysics. Since ethical theory often depends 
on conceptual analysis or metaphysical assumptions, cases are often employed to test or query 
such assumptions. The use of cases for conceptual analysis have been analysed in detail 
elsewhere
20
, so we set it aside in the interest of space. We do, however, investigate the use of 
cases for the analysis of metaphysical assumptions by looking at the metaphysics of causation 
and the metaphysics of harm. Cases of this type are often counter-intuitive: rather than being 
used to elicit intuitions, they show us that our intuitions and our background assumptions are 
in tension. 
For an example of how ethics is influenced by the metaphysics of causation, consider 
overdetermination cases such as Parfit’s two assassins: 
“X and Y simultaneously shoot and kill me. Either shot, by itself, would have killed.” 
(Parfit 1984, p. 70) 
This raises questions about causation: whether X (or Y) has caused the death of hypothetical 
Derek. And entangled with this is the question if and why X or Y act wrongly, and whether X 
or Y are individually responsible for Derek’s death. At the minimum, the case illustrates the 
questions to be discussed, but it also triggers judgements about both the causal and the ethical 
claims. The two assassins make us question common background assumptions about causation. 
For instance, a common understanding of causation is that the cause is necessary for effect. But 
that common understanding (together with some further auxiliary assumptions) leads to 
counterintuitive judgements about wrongfulness and responsibility in overdetermination cases, 
challenging the reader to revise either the background assumption about causation or the 
judgements about these cases.
21
   
For an example of how the metaphysics of harm influences ethical theory, consider Warren S. 
Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer.
22
 A patient can increase the electric current flowing through 
their body in tiny steps, such that the effect of each tiny increase is imperceptible, but come with 
a payment of $10,000. The patient therefore prefers to nudge up the current at each step. 
However, once increased the current cannot be reduced, and once many steps have been taken, 
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the pain becomes so unbearable that the patient would give up all his money to make it stop. 
This raises important questions about the analysis of harms that fall below the threshold of 
perceptibility. For instance, a common understanding of harm is that it must be directly 
perceptible. Another common understanding is that a relationship like “is as harmful as” is 
transitive, such that if A is as harmful as B and B is as harmful as C then A is as harmful as C. 
But these two assumptions (together with some further auxiliary assumptions) lead to the 
counterintuitive result that the lowest setting harms the self-torturer just as much as the highest 
setting, which is patently absurd. Either the assumptions or (less likely) the judgement must be 
revised.  
For a case that tests underlying assumptions about identity and harm, take Parfit’s example-rich 
discussion of the non-identity problem. In Parfit’s desription of The 14 Year Old Girl, the 
mother “would have had a different child” (Parfit 1984, p. 358), which is the starting point for 
a reasoning process about the fragility of identity and comparative notions of harming. The 
point of this case is, yet again, not only to elicit an intuition, but also to make the reader reason 
about the case. Parfit explicitly pursues both goals when discussing a related example: “My 
reaction is not merely an intuition. It is the judgement that I reach by reasoning” (Parfit 1984, 
p. 368), which is followed by a detailed engagement with the case to support Parfit’s view. This 
is a paradigmatic example for a case that forces us to analyse the background assumptions 
underpinning the relevant moral judgements and to potentially revise the judgements in light of 
what we learn.  
What makes the cases for testing metaphysical assumptions so powerful is that they also have a 
representative role: our interest lies not in synchronized assassins, confused self-torturers, bean-
stealing bandits, and perhaps not (or not exclusively) in the challenges of teenage pregnancy. 
Our interest arises because these construed cases represent larger classes of realistic cases that 
are highly relevant, and it is this power to represent that makes these cases relevant: they make 
us realize that some of the conventional thinking about applied, real-world cases might rest on 
muddled or at least questionable assumptions. 
Cases for testing metaphysical assumptions typically play an auxiliary role in applied ethics and 
political philosophy by helping to investigate, clarify or revise background assumptions, though 
they can take centre stage in more theoretical projects. In the normal sequence of case use they 
are most useful after principles have been formulated. This is because they can serve as a check 
on the metaphysical assumptions made in the principle formulation. But in more theoretical 
projects, the case may be needed right at the start: to set up the puzzle and frame the debate. 
Which order works best depends on the context of the investigation and the division of labour 
12 
 
between theoretical and applied ethics. Interestingly, the debate about case use has largely 
overlooked this function of cases even though this category contains some of the most influential 
thought experiments appealed to in ethics. 
 
Construction cases 
Some of the most famous hypothetical cases in political theory play a role that we have not yet 
described. Construction cases, as we will call them, are used infrequently but often play a key 
role in grand theories. Two of the most famous construction cases are Rawls’s original position 
and Ronald Dworkin’s auction. Like argument cases, they seek to elicit the recognition of 
reasons, guiding the reader to understand, follow and accept arguments—albeit through a more 
complex modelling function. But unlike the cases in the last two categories, construction cases 
are specifically non-representative. They set out frameworks that constrain our reasoning and 
our judgements in particular ways, asking us to imagine a hypothetical, idealized choice 
situation—one that does decidedly not represent real-life choice situations—and to determine 
which outcomes would be accepted under such conditions.
23
 The point of the construction case, 
then, is not to represent real choice situations, but to represent a plausible theoretical starting 
point that provides a focus for further normative theorising.  
Construction cases can be understood as the final step, following the process of decomposing 
factors, organizing the factors into principles, and testing these principles against metaphysical 
and folk psychological assumptions. At this point, there will sometimes be factors, the strength 
of which a theorist is enormously confident about, but which people, in general, are likely to 
misjudge in their normative evaluations. Consider, for example, Rawls’ original position. People 
are asked to imagine themselves behind a veil of ignorance that blinds them to their current 
position, privilege, and talents in society and decide upon principles for the societal distribution 
of benefits and burdens without such knowledge. The original position is “modelling the way in 
which the citizens in a well-ordered society, viewed as moral persons, would ideally select first 
principles of justice for their society”.
24
 Rawls calls the original position a “device of 
representation”,
25
 but he means a representation of these normative considerations. This is 
representation in a specifically normative sense—quite different from what philosophers of 
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science have in mind when they think about models.
26
 When justifying the original position, 
Rawls states that it aims to ensure that “no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural 
fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles.”
27
 The case accounts for these 
considerations, in other words, by incorporating into our reasoning a combination of factors, 
the normative significance of which Rawls is confident about—namely, equal concern for 
people’s claims regardless of background and abilities, or fairness.  
The veil of ignorance makes vivid the underlying idea that the choice of principles should not 
be affected by arbitrary factors like unearned natural properties or pre-existing biases. 
Importantly, however, it also takes into account that people are likely to be affected by such 
factors and, thus, misjudge the fairness of potential principles of justice in ways that reflect their 
position and power in society. But as Rawls notes: “it should be impossible to tailor principles 
to the circumstances of one's own case.”
28
 The original position constrains our ability to do so. 
In principle, of course, we could appeal directly to fairness to argue in favour of Rawls’ 
principles. However, using fairness as a constraint on rational choice instead, inhibiting our 
ability to tailor principles to our own circumstances, captures the force of the argument in a 
different way—not least, by encouraging the reader to reach these conclusions from a first-person 
perspective.  
Importantly, construction cases play a dual role in shaping our thinking by facilitating the 
strengthening of certain factors in our reasoning (e.g. fairness and opportunity costs) and helping 
to justify the principles and judgements reached via these cases by lending them added support. 
Thus, the hypothetical agreement itself constitutes an argument in favour of some principles 
(e.g. Rawls’ principles of justice) because the principles have been agreed upon in a choice 
situation that excludes partiality and ensures equal consideration of claims. Usually, discussions 
of construction cases focus solely on this principle-supporting output.
29
 In DRE, however, we 
emphasize the double part that construction cases play in the process of justification. First, by 
using input from the previous stages to determine how our reasoning should be constrained. 
Second, by providing an additional, distinct underpinning for normative principles due to the 
controlled choice-situation into which the chooser is placed. 
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Defence of Directed Reflective Equilibrium  
 
 
Seed cases can be hypothetical but are often better taken from real life, for two reasons. First, 
one criticism of hypothetical cases is that they problematically abstract from real world issues. 
We will address this criticism when we talk about decomposition and how this underpins the 
representative function of cases, but for now it is important to note that, even if cases can 
successfully represent similar factors in different contexts, seed cases provide the initial impetus 
for determining what those factors are. They establish the boundaries of the moral 
phenomenon under investigation. Beginning the enquiry with a real-world seed case, however 
complex or “murky” from an analytic perspective, helps to focus the enquiry on the salient 
moral factors – or, as Susanne Burri puts it in a recent article, starting from real-world seed 
cases helps ensure “practical applicability”.
30
 This enables the directional approach to address 
one of the problems we previously noted with regard to RE. RE does not prescribe any specific 
starting point for moral theory. A theorist might start from a specific case but might equally start 
from an abstract principle. The use of seed cases in DRE, by contrast, represents an attractive 
middle ground between fixating on specific real-world problems and pursuing highly abstract 
theory.                         
Second, such seed cases have a better chance of maintaining real-world representativeness. If 
one begins from a real case, after the following steps are completed (see sections XXXXX), 
there is a higher likelihood that resulting principles will maintain their representative connection 
to the real moral phenomenon. This also helps DRE address the problem of abstractionism. 
Further variations on cases, which tend increasingly towards the creation of far fetched or 
fantastical examples, are more likely to maintain their representativeness if they are based on 
seed cases rather than beginning immediately with cases designed to isolate one moral factor 
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It is important to keep in mind, furthermore, that the point of this systematic analysis is not just 
to pull apart complex cases, but to stitch them back together again and look at them anew, 
hopefully with a deeper understanding of their moral complexity. To evaluate the case of 
vaccination campaigns, for example, we might also want to explore factors like the role 
obligations of doctors and nurses, how to ensure continued trust in the health system, and 
upholding political ideals of equal respect and concern for individuals.  
This is significant because, although seed cases have intuitive pull, the intuitions they elicit are 
frequently muddled and obscured by being bundled up in complex ways. Multiple normative 
factors often coexist, making it difficult to appreciate which judgments or reasons, if any, are 
supported by which factor. Because of this, it is often valuable to analyse cases in which moral 
considerations that typically coexist are separated to see how they function independently. This 
often requires constructing controlled cases since in most realistic cases the considerations that 
we wish to pull apart are found together. Controlled cases offer a useful analytic tool to achieve 
this. When faced with a complex, perhaps real world, moral case, we are presented with a 
choice: we can either evaluate the case in all its complexity, attempting to discuss relevant 
considerations without comparison with other cases. Alternatively, we can tease apart different 
factors by considering other cases where these factors are present, but others that co-existed 
with it in the original case are absent. Thus, a single complex case can become a family tree of 
cases.  
Controlled cases like Drowning Child or Trolley thus deliberately aim to test or support the 
importance of specific factors by isolating their intuitive pull and suppressing the effect of other 
factors. Factors are explored, then, by eliciting intuitions about them individually (or, if 
necessary, in deliberate interaction with other factors) and good hypothetical cases are ones that 
both represent factors present in a number of real life cases and elicit clear intuitive responses. 
As mentioned, Drowning Child is inspired by an actual famine in South Asia. Alleviating actual 
famines by donating money to charities, of course, does not happen as straightforwardly as does 
saving the child in Singer’s example. Many have raised worries about factors which are relevant 
when considering charitable donations that are not present in Drowning Child. Some worry, 
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for example, that, unlike saving the drowning child, charitable donations are often ineffective, 
create and uphold relations of dependency, help sustain corrupt governments, and that they do 
not suffice to remedy global poverty and injustice.
31
  
In the role controlled cases are meant to play in DRE, however, Drowning Child is not meant 
to include these factors because it is not meant to replicate the normative complexity of an actual 
famine. Rather, it is meant to isolate and foreground the intuitive pull of one factor—being able 
to help others greatly at little cost to oneself. In this particular example, the case is also meant 
to suppress another factor, which is present and which is often given exaggerated importance in 
cases of actual charitable donations—geographical distance. Drowning Child does not tell us 
what to do when faced with an actual famine, but it helps us untangle the complexity of the 
situation by highlighting factors that we are liable to underappreciate and subduing other factors, 
the importance of which we are liable to overestimate (such as geographical distance). More 
generally, then, hypothetical cases representing decomposed factors can help provide clarity 
about the real-life dilemmas of seed cases, in which factors are intertwined and obscured. 
Controlled cases will sometimes require an unrealistic setup in order to isolate the relevant 
factors.
32
 Consider Thomson’s ‘people-seeds’ example.
33
 In this case, people-seeds drift about 
in the air like pollen, and despite the mesh screens erected to prevent their entry, they take root 
in the carpet and start to grow, eventually turning into human beings. Though this example is 
absurd, it is intended to be analogous to pregnancy via intercourse that one has taken reasonable 
steps to avoid. Since there are no realistic cases of this kind (except actual pregnancies that 
cannot function as analogies) the analogy is necessarily fantastical. Again, the case does not give 
us conclusive evidence about the real-life dilemma from which the factor is drawn—the 
permissibility of abortion. It does, however, provide information about one important factor of 
such dilemmas: the extent to which we can incur demanding, individual obligations to sustain 
potential human life when we have taken all reasonable steps to avoid this potentiality. 
Compared to standard reflective equilibrium, our approach has two advantages. Both stem from 
the fact that DRE distinguishes clearly between seed cases (not to be confused with Thomson’s 
people-seed case), drawn from real life, and hypothetical controlled cases and how and when 
the two are best used. First, in standard reflective equilibrium, real and hypothetical cases are 
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not clearly distinguished as sources of intuitions or considered judgements, but play the same 
role in the process of building and testing principles. On our view, while both types of cases 
elicit intuitions, the two play different roles in the justificatory process. Intuitions drawn from 
real-life cases will often less reliably track particular factors because such cases are messier and, 
thus, it will be less clear which factor(s) is causing the elicitation.
34
 Controlled cases, on the other 
hand, can isolate specific factors and elicit targeted intuitions to test their force. Our intuitions 
about real-life cases, then, are made clearer when the various factors are decomposed and 
reconstructed into factor-representative controlled cases.  
Second, standard reflective equilibrium does not include the precept of beginning or grounding 
one’s normative exploration in seed cases. On the standard approach, intuitions drawn from 
hypothetical examples can, in principle, be entirely unconnected to real-life situations. This 
gives rise to the worry that such intuitions have little bearing on actual moral and political 
dilemmas. Thus, while intuitions elicited by hypothetical cases better track individual normative 
factors, the guidance such intuitions provide for moral and political agency is limited, if the 
hypotheticals are not grounded in real life. Our method seeks to alleviate this shortcoming by 
integrating a basis in reality by urging theorists to start from seed cases and keep a constant eye 
on how different factors under consideration appear in actual dilemmas (sometimes, this will 
happen by urging theorists to work backwards from a seemingly relevant factor to seed cases in 
which this factor exists). 
Working with Controlled Cases, philosophers aim at discovering regularities and to capture 
these regularities in principles. We will now turn to the role of principles in reflective 





Unsurprisingly, thought experiments come into their own when such test cases are required. 
Thought experiments can be used to consider situations that can have never arisen in real-life 
(or are unknown to the philosopher). They can help construct “clean” controlled cases that 
focus only on the factors under consideration. And they easily lend themselves for thinking 
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about extreme or “corner” cases, or for constructing a series of cases to be considered in 
comparison such that only one factor varies.  
The idea of controlling for factors can be observed in the large class of Trolley cases and their 
comparison. For instance, several variations of Trolley explore whether harm as a side effect 
and harm as a means to an end ought to be assessed differently, thereby testing the Doctrine of 
Double Effect. Counterexamples are also a popular choice of case because a convincing 
counterexample provides strong evidence against a principle. Nozick’s Utility Monster, for 
instance, can also be read as a counterexample to some forms of utilitarianism.  
Despite all these advantages of thought experiments, real-world cases also have their place in 
principle testing. Going back to the initial seed cases helps philosophers to assess whether the 
principle works for the richer descriptions the seed cases provide. And in some instances, 
revisions in the initial assessment of the seed cases are required to achieve equilibrium.  
[a case study of a mistake would be nice here! Perhaps an example from the history of 
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